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Abstract
Both uncertainty estimation and interpretability are important factors for trustwor-
thy machine learning systems. However, there is little work at the intersection of
these two areas. We address this gap by proposing a novel method for interpreting
uncertainty estimates from differentiable probabilistic models, like Bayesian Neural
Networks (BNNs). Our method, Counterfactual Latent Uncertainty Explanations
(CLUE), indicates how to change an input, while keeping it on the data manifold,
such that a BNN becomes more confident about the input’s prediction. We validate
CLUE through 1) a novel framework for evaluating counterfactual explanations of
uncertainty, 2) a series of ablation experiments, and 3) a user study. Our experi-
ments show that CLUE outperforms baselines and enables practitioners to better
understand which input patterns are responsible for predictive uncertainty.
1 Introduction
There is growing interest in probabilistic machine learning models, which aim to provide reliable
estimates of uncertainty about their predictions [1]. These estimates are helpful in high-stakes
applications such as predicting loan defaults or recidivism, or in work towards autonomous vehicles.
Well-calibrated uncertainty can be as important as making accurate predictions, leading to increased
robustness of automated decision-making systems and helping prevent systems from behaving
erratically for out-of-distribution (OOD) test points. In practice, predictive uncertainty conveys
skepticism about a model’s output. However, its utility need not stop there: we posit predictive
uncertainty could be rendered more useful and actionable if it were expressed in terms of model
inputs, answering the question: “Which input patterns lead my prediction to be uncertain?”
Understanding which input features are responsible for predictive uncertainty can help practitioners
learn in which regions the training data is sparse. For example, when training a loan default predictor, a
data scientist (i.e., practitioner) can identify sub-groups (by age, gender, race, etc.) under-represented
in the training data. Collecting more data from these groups, and thus further constraining their
model’s parameters, could lead to accurate predictions for a broader range of clients. In a clinical
scenario, a doctor (i.e., domain expert) can use an automated decision-making system to assess
whether a patient should receive a treatment. In the case of high uncertainty, the system would
suggest that the doctor should not rely on its output. If uncertainty were explained in terms of which
features the model finds anomalous, the doctor could appropriately direct their attention.
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: Workflow for automated decision making with transparency. Our probabilistic classifier
produces a distribution over outputs. In cases of high uncertainty, CLUE allows us to identify features
which are responsible for class ambiguity in the input (denoted by ∆ and highlighted in dark blue).
Otherwise, we resort to existing feature importance approaches to explain certain decisions.
While explaining predictions from deep models has become a burgeoning field [2; 3], there has been
relatively little research on explaining what leads to neural networks’ predictive uncertainty. In this
work, we introduce Counterfactual Latent Uncertainty Explanations (CLUE), to our knowledge, the
first approach to shed light on the subset of input space features that are responsible for uncertainty in
probabilistic models. Specifically, we focus on explaining Bayesian Neural Networks (BNNs). We
refer to the explanations given by our method as CLUEs. CLUEs answer the question: “What is the
smallest change that could be made to an input, while keeping it in distribution, so that our model
becomes more certain in its decision for said input?” CLUEs can be generated for tabular and image
data on both classification and regression tasks.
To maximize transparency in the real-world deployment of a BNN, we envision CLUE complementing
existing approaches to model interpretability [4; 5; 6], as shown in Figure 1. When the BNN is
confident in its prediction, practitioners can generate an explanation via a feature importance technique.
When the BNN has high uncertainty, CLUE can be used. We highlight the following contributions:
• We introduce CLUE, an approach that finds counterfactual explanations of uncertainty in
input space, by searching in the latent space of a deep generative model (DGM). We put
forth an algorithm for generating CLUEs and show how CLUEs are best displayed.
• We propose a computationally grounded approach for evaluating counterfactual explanations
of uncertainty. It leverages a separate conditional DGM as a synthetic data generator,
allowing us to quantify how well explanations reflect the true generative process of the data.
• We evaluate CLUE quantitatively through comparison to baseline approaches under the
above framework and through ablative analysis. We also perform a user study, showing that
CLUEs allow practitioners to predict on which new inputs a BNN will be uncertain.
2 Related Work
2.1 Preliminaries: Uncertainty in BNNs
Given a dataset D= {x(n),y(n)}Nn=1, a prior on our model’s weights p(w), and a likelihood func-
tion p(D|w)=∏Nn=1 p(y(n)|x(n),w), the posterior distribution over the predictor’s parameters
p(w|D)∝ p(D|w)p(w) encodes our uncertainty about what value w should take. Through marginal-
ization, this parameter uncertainty is translated into predictive uncertainty, yielding reliable error
bounds and preventing overfitting:
p(y∗|x∗,D) =
∫
p(y∗|x∗,w)p(w|D) dw. (1)
For BNNs, both the posterior over parameters and predictive distribution (1) are intractable. Fortu-
nately, there is a rich literature concerning approximations to these objects [1; 7; 8]. In this work, we
use scale adapted Stochastic Gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (SG-HMC) [9]. For regression, we
use Gaussian likelihood functions, quantifying uncertainty using their standard deviation, σ(y|x).
For classification, we take the entropy H(y|x) of categorical distributions as uncertainty. Details are
given in Appendix B. In the rest of this work, we useH to refer to any uncertainty metric, be it σ or
H . Bayesian methods enable NNs to be used for uncertainty aware tasks, such as OOD detection
[10], continual learning [11], active learning [12], and Bayesian optimization [9].
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Figure 2: Left: Training points and predictive distribution for variational Bayesian Logistic Regression
on the Moons dataset. Center: Aleatoric entropy Ha matches regions of class non-separability. Right:
Epistemic entropy He grows away from the data. Both uncertainties are detailed in Appendix B.2.
Predictive uncertainty can be separated into two components, as shown in Figure 2. Each conveys
different information to practitioners [13]. Irreducible or aleatoric uncertainty is caused by inherent
noise in the generative process of the data, usually manifesting as class overlap. Model or epistemic
uncertainty represents our lack of knowledge about w. Stemming from a model being under-specified
by the data, epistemic uncertainty arises when we query points off the training manifold or points in
sparse regions. Capturing model uncertainty is the main advantage of BNNs over regular NNs.
2.2 Uncertainty Sensitivity Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing method for interpreting uncertainty estimates is
Uncertainty Sensitivity Analysis [14]. This method quantifies the global importance of an input
dimension to a chosen metric of uncertaintyH using a sum of linear approximations centered at each
test point:
Ii =
1
|Dtest|
|Dtest|∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣∂H(yn|xn)∂xn,i
∣∣∣∣ . (2)
As discussed by Rudin [15], linear explanations of non-linear models, such as BNNs, can be mis-
leading. Even generalized linear models, which are often considered to be “inherently interpretable,”
like logistic regression, produce non-linear uncertainty estimates in input space. This can be seen in
Figure 2. Furthermore, high-dimensional input spaces limit the actionability of these explanations,
as∇xH will likely not point in the direction of the data manifold. In Figure 3 and Appendix D, we
show how this can result in sensitivity analysis generating meaningless explanations.
Our method, CLUE, leverages the latent space of a DGM to avoid working with high-dimensional
input spaces and to ensure explanations are in-distribution. CLUE does not rely on crude linear
approximations. The counterfactual nature of CLUE guarantees explanations have tangible meaning.
Figure 3: Left: Taking a step in the direction of maximum sensitivity leads to a seemingly noisy input
configuration for which H is small. Right: Minimizing CLUE’s uncertainty-based objective in terms
of a DGM’s latent variable z produces a plausible digit with a corrected lower portion.
2.3 Counterfactual Explanations
The term “counterfactual” captures notions of what would have happened if something had been
different. Two meanings have been used by ML subcommunities. (1) Those in causal inference
make causal assumptions about interdependencies among variables and use these assumptions to
incorporate appropriate consequential adjustments when particular variables are set to new values
[16; 17]. (2) In contrast, the interpretability community recently used “counterfactual explanations”
to explore how input variables must be modified to change a model’s output without making explicit
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causal assumptions [18]. In this work, we use “counterfactual” in a sense similar to (2): we seek
small changes to an input in order to reduce its uncertainty without explicit causal assumptions.
Multiple counterfactual explanations can exist for any given input, as the functions we are interested
in explaining are often non-injective [19]. Generally, we are concerned with counterfactual input
configurations that are close to the original input x0 according to some pairwise distance metric d(·, ·).
Given a desired outcome c different from the original one y0 produced by predictor pI , counterfactual
explanations xc are usually generated by solving an optimization problem that resembles:
xc = arg maxx (pI(y=c|x)− d(x,x0)) s.t. y0 6=c. (3)
Naively optimizing (3) in high-dimensional input spaces may result in the creation of adversarial
examples which are not actionable [20]. Telling a person that they would have been approved for a
loan had their age been−10 is of very little use. To right this, recent work introduces DGMs to ensure
explanations are in-distribution [6; 21; 22; 23]. We dub these auxiliary DGMs. Others define linear
constraints on explanations [24; 19]. CLUE avoids the above issues by searching for counterfactuals
in the lower-dimensional latent space of an auxiliary DGM. This choice is well suited for uncertainty,
as the DGM effectively constrains CLUE’s search space to the data manifold. When faced with an
OOD input, CLUE returns the nearest in-distribution analog, as shown in Figure 3.
3 Proposed Method
Without loss of generality, we useH to refer to any differentiable estimate of uncertainty (σ or H).
We introduce an auxiliary latent variable DGM: pθ(x) =
∫
pθ(x|z)p(z) dz. In the rest of this paper,
we will use the decoder from a variational autoencoder (VAE). Its encoder is denoted as qφ(z|x). We
write these models’ predictive means as Epθ(x|z)[x]=µθ(x|z) and Eqφ(z|x)[z]=µφ(z|x) respectively.
CLUE aims to find points in latent space which generate inputs similar to an original observation x0
but are assigned low uncertainty. This is achieved by minimizing (4). CLUEs are then decoded as (5).
L(z) = H(y|µθ(x|z)) + d(µθ(x|z),x0), (4)
xCLUE = µθ(x|zCLUE) where zCLUE = arg minzL(z). (5)
The pairwise distance metric takes the form d(x,x0) =λxdx(x,x0) + λydy(f(x), f(x0)) such that
we can enforce similarity between uncertain points and CLUEs in both input and prediction space.
The hyperparameters (λx, λy) control the trade-off between producing low uncertainty CLUEs
and CLUEs which are close to the original inputs. In this work, we take dx(x,x0) = ‖x − x0‖1
to encourage sparse explanations. For regression, dy(f(x), f(x0)) is mean squared error. For
classification, we use cross-entropy. Note that the best choice for d(·, ·) will be task-specific.
The CLUE algorithm and a diagram of our procedure are provided in Algorithm 1 and Figure 4
respectively. CLUE can be applied to batches of inputs simultaneously, allowing us to leverage
GPU-accelerated matrix computation. The hyperparameter λx is selected for each dataset and type of
uncertainty by cross validation. We set λy to 0 for our main experiments but explore different values
Algorithm 1: CLUE
Inputs: original datapoint x0, distance
function d(·, ·), BNN uncertainty
estimatorH, DGM decoder µθ(·),
DGM encoder µφ(·)
1 Set initial value of z = µφ(z|x0);
2 while loss L is not converged do
3 Decode: x = µθ(x|z);
4 Use BNN to obtainH(y|x) ;
5 L = H(y|x) + d(x,x0);
6 Update z with∇z L;
7 end
8 Decode explanation: xCLUE = µθ(x|z);
Output: Counterfactual example xCLUE
Figure 4: Latent codes are decoded into inputs for
which a BNN generates uncertainty estimates; its
gradients are backpropagated to latent space.
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in Appendix H.1. We minimize (4) with Adam. To facilitate optimization, the initial value of z is
chosen to be z0=µφ(z|x0). Optimization runs for a minimum of three iterations and a maximum of
35 iterations, with a learning rate of 0.1. If the decrease in L(z) is smaller than L(z0)/100 for three
consecutive iterations, we apply early stopping. Our implementation is detailed in full in Appendix B.
As noted by Wachter et al. [18], individual counterfactuals may not shed light on all important features.
Fortunately, we can exploit the non-convexity of CLUE’s objective to address this. We initialize
CLUE with z0 =µφ(z|x0) + , where =N (z;0, σ0I), and perform Algorithm 1 multiple times to
obtain different CLUEs. We find σ0 = 0.15 to give a good trade-off between optimization speed and
CLUE diversity. Appendix C shows examples of different CLUEs obtained for the same inputs.
Original CLUE ∆CLUE
(a) MNIST (b) LSAT
Figure 5: Example image and tabular CLUEs.
We want to ensure noise from auxiliary DGM re-
construction does not affect CLUE visualization.
For tabular data, we use the change in percentile
of each input feature with respect to the training
distribution as a measure of importance. We
only highlight continuous variables for which
CLUEs are separated by 15 percentile points or
more from their original inputs. All changes to
discrete variables are highlighted. For images,
we report changes in pixel values by applying
a sign-preserving quadratic function to the dif-
ference between CLUEs and original samples:
∆CLUE=|∆x|·∆x with ∆x=xCLUE−x0. This
is showcased in Figure 5 and in Appendix G.
4 A Framework for Evaluating Counterfactual Explanations of Uncertainty
Evaluating explanations quantitatively (without resorting to expensive user studies) is a hard task [25;
26]. We put forth a computational framework to evaluate counterfactual explanations of uncertainty.
In the spirit of [27], we desire counterfactuals that are 1) informative: they should highlight features
which affect our BNN’s uncertainty, and 2) relevant: they should lie close to the original inputs.
Counterfactuals must also represent plausible parameter settings, lying close to the data manifold.
Recall, from Figure 3, that low uncertainty inputs can be constructed by applying adversarial
perturbations to high uncertainty ones. We make our evaluation robust to this by introducing an
additional DGM to act as a “ground truth” data generating process (g.t. DGM). Specifically, we use
a variational autoencoder with arbitrary conditioning [28] (g.t. VAEAC). It jointly models inputs
and targets pgt(x,y), as well as the conditional distribution over targets given inputs, pgt(y|x). This
allows us to evaluate if counterfactuals address the true sources of uncertainty in the data, as opposed
to exploiting adversarial vulnerabilities. The evaluation procedure, shown in Figure 6, is as follows:
1. Train a g.t. VAEAC on a real dataset to obtain pgt(x,y) as well as conditionals pgt(y|x).
2. Sample artificial data (x¯, y¯)∼ pgt(x,y). Use them to train a BNN and an auxiliary DGM.
3. Sample more artificial data. Generate counterfactual explanations x¯c for uncertain samples.
4. Use the g.t. VAEAC to obtain the conditional distribution over targets given counterfactual
inputs pgt(y|x¯c) and evaluate if counterfactuals are on-manifold through log pgt(x¯c).
1. Train g.t. VAEAC
on real data
2. Train BNN, VAE
on artificial data
3. Generate counterfactuals
for artificial data
4. Evaluate counterfactuals 
with g.t. VAEAC
Hgt
errgt
log pgt(x¯c)
Figure 6: Pipeline for computational evaluation of counterfactual explanations of uncertainty. The
VAEAC which we treat as a data generating process is colored in green. Colored in orange is the
auxiliary DGM used by the approach being evaluated. For approaches that do not use an auxiliary
DGM, like Uncertainty Sensitivity Analysis, the orange element will not be present.
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Given an uncertain artificially generated test point x¯0 ∼ pgt and its corresponding counterfactual ex-
planation x¯c, we quantify informativeness as the amount of uncertainty that has been explained away.
The variance (or entropy) of pgt(y|x) reflects the ground truth aleatoric uncertainty associated with x.
Hence, for aleatoric uncertainty, we quantify informativeness as ∆Hgt = Epgt [Hgt(y|x¯0)−Hgt(y|x¯c)].
Epistemic uncertainty only depends on our BNN. It cannot be directly computed from pgt(y|x). How-
ever, its reduction can be measured implicitly through the reduction in the BNN’s prediction error
with respect to the labels outputted by the g.t. VAEAC: ∆err gt = Epgt [err gt(x¯0)− err gt(x¯c)]. Here
err gt(x) = dy(p(y|x), arg maxy pgt(y|x)). Approaches that exploit adversarial weaknesses in the
BNN will not transfer to the g.t. VAEAC, failing to reduce uncertainty or error. We assess the rele-
vance of counterfactuals through their likelihood under the g.t. VAEAC log pgt(x¯c) and through their
`1 distance to the original inputs ‖∆x¯‖1 = ‖x¯0 − x¯c‖1. Further discussion is included in Appendix I.
5 Experiments
We validate CLUE on 5 datasets: LSAT academic performance regression [29], UCI Wine quality
regression, UCI Credit classification [30], a 7 feature variant of COMPAS recidivism classification
[31], and MNIST image classification [32]. For each, we select roughly the 20% most uncertain test
points as those for which we reject our BNNs’ decisions. We only generate CLUEs for “rejected”
points. Rejection thresholds, model architectures, and hyperparameter settings are in Appendix B.
As a baseline, we introduce a localized version of Uncertainty Sensitivity Analysis. It produces
counterfactuals by taking a single step in the direction of the gradient of an input’s uncertainty
estimates xc =x0−η∇xH(y|x0). Averaging |x0−xc| across a test set, we recover (2). As a second
baseline, we adapt FIDO [6], a counterfactual feature importance method, to explain uncertainty. We
dub it U-FIDO. This method places a binary mask b over the set of input variables xU . The mask
is modeled by a product of Bernoulli random variables: pρ(b) =
∏
u∈U Bern(bu; ρu). The set of
masked inputs xB is substituted by its expectation under an auxiliary conditional generative model
p(xB |xU\B), fixed to be a VAEAC. U-FIDO finds the masking parameters ρ which minimize (6):
L(ρ) = Epρ(b)[H(y|xc(b)) + λb‖b‖1], (6)
xc(b) = b x0 + (1− b) Ep(xB |xU\B)[xB ]. (7)
Counterfactuals are generated by (7), where  is the Hadamard product. We also compare and
contrast CLUE with existing non-counterfactual feature importance methods [4; 33] in Appendix F.
5.1 Computational Evaluation
We compare CLUE, Localized Sensitivity, and U-FIDO using the evaluation framework put forth
in Section 4. We would like counterfactuals to explain away as much uncertainty as possible while
staying as close the to original inputs as possible. We manage this informativeness (large ∆Hgt)
to relevance (small ‖∆x¯‖1) trade-off with the hyperparameters η, λx, and λb for Local Sensitivity,
CLUE, and U-FIDO respectively. We perform a logarithmic grid search over hyperparameters and
plot Pareto-like curves. Our two metrics of interest take minimum values of 0 but their maximum
is dataset and method dependent. For Sensitivity, ‖∆x¯‖1 grows linearly with η. For CLUE and
U-FIDO, these metrics saturate for large and small values of λx (or λb). As a result, the values
obtained by these methods do not overlap. As shown in Figure 7, CLUE is able to explain away more
uncertainty (∆Hgt) than U-FIDO, and U-FIDO always obtains smaller values of ‖∆x¯‖1 than CLUE.
To construct a single performance metric, we scale all measurements by the maximum values obtained
between U-FIDO or CLUE, e.g. (
√
2 · max(∆Hgt U-FIDO,∆Hgt CLUE))−1, linearly mapping them
to [0, 1/√2]. We then negate ∆Hgt, making its optimum value 0. We consider each method’s best
performing hyperparameter configuration, as determined by its curve’s point nearest the origin, or
knee-point. The euclidean distance from each method’s knee-point to the origin acts as a metric of
relative performance. The best value is 0 and the worst is 1. Knee-point distances, computed across
three runs, are shown for both uncertainty types in Table 1.
Local Sensitivity performs poorly on all datasets except COMPAS. We attribute this to only two
features being necessary to predict targets [34]. U-FIDO’s input space masking mechanism allows
for counterfactuals that leave features unchanged. It performs well in low dimensional problems but
leads to high variance as dimensionality grows. CLUE performs best on higher dimensional datasets.
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Latent space optimization makes CLUE more robust to input space complexity. In Appendix H.2,
we replace input space similarity ‖∆x¯‖1 with proximity to the data manifold log pgt(x¯c). Therein,
CLUE produces the most in-distribution counterfactuals, performing best in 8 out of 10 experiments.
Table 1: Relative performance measure obtained by all methods on
all datasets under consideration. Lower is better. The dimensionality
of each dataset is listed next to their names. e and a indicate results
for epistemic (∆err gt) and aleatoric (∆Hgt) uncertainty respectively.
Method LSAT (4) COMPAS (7) Wine (11) Credit (23) MNIST (784)
e a e a e a e a e a
Sensitivity 0.70 0.67 0.71 0.13 0.69 0.03 0.63 0.50 0.66 0.68
CLUE 0.52 0.64 0.71 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.52 0.29 0.26 0.27
U-FIDO 0.36 0.51 0.71 0.31 0.22 0.02 0.45 0.63 0.38 0.50
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
||∆x¯||1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
∆
H
g
t Sens.
CLUE
U-FIDO
Knee pt
Figure 7: MNIST knee-points.
5.2 User Study
CLUE’s promising results in computational evaluation do not substitute for human-based evaluation
[25]. We want to assess if CLUEs help machine learning practitioners identify sources of uncertainty
more than simple linear approximations (Local Sensitivity) or human intuition. To do this, we propose
a forward-simulation task. We show practitioners one datapoint below our “rejection” threshold and
one datapoint above. The former is labeled as certain and the latter as uncertain; we refer to these
as context points. The certain context point serves as a counterfactual explanation of the uncertain
context point’s uncertainty. Using context points for reference, practitioners are asked to predict
whether a new test point will be above or below our threshold (i.e., will our BNN’s uncertainty be
high or low for the new point). Our survey compares the utility of certain context points generated by
CLUE relative to those generated by baseline approaches. An example question is shown in Figure 9.
In our survey, we compare four different methods, varying how we select certain context points. We
either 1) select a certain point at random from the test set as a control, generate a counterfactual
certain point with 2) Local Sensitivity or with 3) CLUE, or 4) display a human selected certain point
(Human CLUE). To generate a Human CLUE, we ask participants (who will not take the main survey)
to pair uncertain context points with similar certain points. We select the points used in our main
survey with a pilot procedure similar to Grgic-Hlaca et al. [35]. This procedure, shown in Figure 8,
prevents us from injecting biases into point selection and ensures context points are relevant to test
points. In our procedure, a participant is shown a pool of randomly selected certain and uncertain
points. We ask this participant to select points from this pool: these will be test points. We then ask
the participant to map each selected test point to a similar uncertain point without replacement. In
this way, we obtain uncertain context points that are relevant to test points.
We use the LSAT and COMPAS datasets in our user study. We have ten different participants take
each variant of the main survey: our participants are students who have taken at least one machine
learning course. The main survey consists of 18 questions, 9 from each dataset. The average accuracy
of a participant by variant is: CLUE (82.22%), Human CLUE (62.22%), Random (61.67%), and
Local Sensitivity (52.78%). To measure statistical significance, we treat each participant-question
pair as an observation; we have 180 observations per variant. Using the Nemenyi test [36], we
determine that the differences in average rank between CLUE and other methods are significant. The
critical distance (CD) for a statistically significant difference between average ranks at α=0.05 is
0.35. The average rank of CLUE is 2.15, while Human CLUE, Random, and Local Sensitivity obtain
2.55, 2.56, and 2.73 respectively: our CD is 0.4. Additional analysis is included in Appendix H.3.
1) Participant A selects 
a test point at random 
from the test set
Main SurveyPilot Procedure
Entire 
Test Set
Certain
Uncertain
2) Participant A pairs 
the selected point with 
an uncertain context 
point
Test Point
Uncertain Context Point
Human CLUE
3) Generate certain 
context point based on 
method being evaluated
RandomSensitivity
CLUE
Certain Context Point
4) Participants identify 
the certainty of the test 
point given the two 
context points
Test Set w/o 
certain points
{
Figure 8: Experimental workflow for our tabular data user study.
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Figure 9: Example question shown to main survey participants for the COMPAS dataset: Given the
uncertain example on the left and the certain example in the middle, will the model be certain on the
test example on the right? The red text highlights the features that differ between context points.
We find that linear explanations (Local Sensitivity) of a non-linear function (BNN) mislead practi-
tioners and perform worse than random. While Human CLUE uses observed points as explanations,
CLUE generates explanations from a VAE. We conjecture that this results in CLUEs representing
more typical feature configurations. This might make CLUEs relevant to a wider range of test points.
In our tabular data user study, we only show one pair of context points per test point. We find that
otherwise the survey is difficult for practitioners to follow, due to non-expertise in college admissions
or criminal justice. Using MNIST, we run a smaller scale study, wherein we show larger sets of
context points to practitioners. Results are in Appendix J.2: again, CLUE outperforms baselines.
5.3 Analysis of CLUE’s Auxiliary Deep Generative Model
We study CLUE’s reliance on its auxiliary DGM. Further ablative analysis is found in Appendix H.
Initialization Strategy: We compare Algorithm 1’s encoder-based initialization z0 =µφ(z|x0) with
z0 =0. As shown in Figure 10, for high dimensional datasets, like MNIST, initializing z with the
encoder’s mean leads to CLUEs that require smaller changes in input space to explain away similar
amounts of uncertainty (i.e., more relevant). In Appendix H.1, similar behavior is observed for Credit,
our second highest dimensional dataset. On other datasets, both approaches yield indistinguishable
results. This shows CLUEs can be generated with differentiable DGMs that lack an encoding
mechanism, such as GANs. These could prove useful when dealing with more complex data.
Capacity of CLUE’s DGM: Figure 10 shows how auto-encoding uncertain MNIST samples with
low-capacity VAEs significantly reduces these points’ predictive entropy. CLUEs generated with
these VAEs highlight features that the VAEs are unable to reproduce but are not reflective of our
BNN’s uncertainty. This results in large values of ‖∆x‖1; although counterfactual examples are
indeed more certain than the original samples, they contain unnecessary changes. As our auxiliary
DGMs’ capacity increases, the amount of uncertainty preserved when auto-encoding inputs increases
as well. ‖∆x‖1 decreases while the predictive entropy of our CLUEs stays the same. More expressive
DGMs allow for generating sparser CLUEs. Fortunately, even in scenarios where our predictor’s
training dataset is limited, we can train powerful DGMs by leveraging unlabeled data.
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Figure 10: Left: CLUEs are similarly informative under encoder-based and encoder-free initializa-
tions. The colorbar indicates the original samples’ uncertainty. Its horizontal blue line denotes our
rejection threshold. Right: Auxiliary DGMs with more capacity result in more relevant CLUEs.
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6 Conclusion
We propose Counterfactual Latent Uncertainty Explanations (CLUE), a method that reveals which
input features can be changed to reduce the uncertainty of a probabilistic model. CLUE leverages an
auxiliary DGM to ensure counterfactuals lie on the data manifold. For certain inputs, existing feature
importance methods may suffice; however, for uncertain inputs, CLUE excels at providing useful
explanations of which features are responsible for predictive uncertainty. We propose a computational
evaluation framework for counterfactual explanations of uncertainty, and find that CLUE outperforms
baselines quantitatively. We also qualitatively verify CLUE’s utility to practitioners through a user
study. CLUE’s latent space optimization mechanism allows it to cope well with high dimensional
data. Future work can leverage recent advances in scalable BNNs [37] and generative modeling [38]
to explore using CLUE for more complex data, such as natural images and natural language.
Broader Impact
As machine learning models are deployed in high-stakes scenarios, there has been a call for algorith-
mic transparency into models’ behavior. While existing transparency techniques have focused on
which features are important to prediction, our approach tackles scenarios where a reliable prediction
can not be made. This is of special interest to those working with probabilistic models that can
capture both noise and model uncertainty. This paper specifically discusses how to put a model’s
predictive uncertainty in terms of input features.
We view predictive uncertainty as a crucial form of transparency into model behavior. Our technique
has implications on machine learning practitioners who can understand where in input space their
model’s failures lie: which features or feature interactions do we need to solicit to make our system
more robust or in an active learning regime? We foresee practitioners using CLUE not only for model
debugging but also for discovering global uncertainty trends, and better understanding their datasets.
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Appendix
This appendix is formatted as follows.
1. We discuss the datasets used in Appendix A.
2. Implementation details for our experiments are provided in Appendix B.
3. We provide examples of the multiplicity of CLUEs in Appendix C.
4. We discuss the application of uncertainty sensitivity analysis in high dimensional spaces
in Appendix D.
5. We visualize CLUE’s optimization in the latent space in Appendix E.
6. We compare CLUE to existing feature importance techniques in Appendix F.
7. We provide additional examples of CLUEs and U-FIDO counterfactuals in Appendix G.
8. We provide additional experimental results in Appendix H.
9. We note additional details of our computational evaluation framework for counterfactual
explanations of uncertainty in Appendix I.
10. We include more details on the setup of our user studies in Appendix J.
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A Datasets
We employ 5 datasets in our experiments, 4 tabular and one composed of images. All of them are
publicly available. Their details are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of datasets used in our experiments. (*) We use a 7 feature version of COMPAS,
however, other versions exist.
Name Targets Input Type N. Inputs N. Train N. Test
LSAT Continuous Continuous & Categorical 4 17432 4358
COMPAS Binary Continuous & Categorical 7∗ 5554 618
Wine (red) Continuous Continuous 11 1438 160
Credit Binary Continuous & Categorical 24 27000 3000
MNIST Categorical Image (greyscale) 28×28 60000 10000
We use the LSAT loading script from Cole and Williamson [39]’s github page.
The raw data can be downloaded from (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/
throwaway20190523/MonotonicFairness/master/data/law_school_cf_test.csv)
and (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/throwaway20190523/MonotonicFairness/
master/data/law_school_cf_train.csv).
For the COMPAS criminal recidivism prediction dataset we use a modified ver-
sion of Zafar et al. [40]’s loading and pre-processing script. It can be found at
(https://github.com/mbilalzafar/fair-classification/blob/master/disparate_
mistreatment/propublica_compas_data_demo/load_compas_data.py). We add an addi-
tional feature: “days served” which we compute as the difference, measured in days, between
the “c_jail_in” and “c_jail_out” variables. The raw data is found at (https://github.com/
propublica/compas-analysis/blob/master/compas-scores-two-years.csv).
The red wine quality prediction dataset can be obtained from and is described in detail at (https:
//archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/wine+quality).
The default of credit card clients dataset, which we refer to as “Credit” in this work, can be obtained
from and is described in detail at (https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/default+of+
credit+card+clients). Note that this dataset is different from the also commonly used German
credit dataset.
The MNIST handwritten digit image dataset can be obtained from (http://yann.lecun.com/
exdb/mnist/).
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B Implementation Details
B.1 Inference in BNNs
We choose a Monte Carlo (MC) based inference approach for our BNNs due to these not being limited
to localized approximations of the posterior. Specifically, we make use of scale adapted SG-HMC
[9], an approach to stochastic gradient Hamiltonian Monte Carlo with automatic hyperparameter
discovery. This technique estimates the mass matrix and the noise introduced by stochasticity in
the gradients using exponentially decaying moving average filters during the chain’s burn-in phase.
We use a fixed step size of  = 0.01 and batch sizes of 512. We set a diagonal 0 mean Gaussian
prior p(w) = N (w;0, σ2w · I) over each layer of weights. We place a per-layer conjugate Gamma
hyperprior over σ2w with parameters α = β = 10. We periodically update σ
2
w for each layer using
Gibbs sampling.
On MNIST, we burn in our chain for 25 epochs, using the first 15 to estimate SG-HMC parameters.
We re-sample momentum parameters every 10 steps and perform a Gibbs sweep over the prior
variances every 45 steps. We save parameter settings every 2 epochs until a total of 300 sets of
weights are stored. This makes for a total of 625 epochs.
For tabular datasets, we perform a burn-in of 400 epochs, using the first 120 to estimate SG-HMC
parameters. We save weight configurations every 20 epochs until a total of 100 sets if weights are
saved. This makes for a total of 2500 epochs. Momentum is re-sampled every 10 epochs and the
prior over weights is re-sampled every 50 epochs. We use a batch size of 512 for all datasets.
B.2 Computing Uncertainty Estimates
In this work, we consider NNs which parametrize two types of distributions over target variables:
the categorical for classification problems and the Gaussian for regression. For classification, our
networks output a probability vector with elements fk(x,w), corresponding to classes {ck}Kk=1. The
likelihood function is p(y|x,w) = Cat(y; f(x,w)). Given a posterior distribution over weights
p(w|D), we use marginalization (1) to translate uncertainty in w into uncertainty in predictions.
Unfortunately, this operation is intractable for BNNs. We resort to approximating the predictive
posterior with M MC samples:
p(y∗|x∗,D) = Ep(w|D)[p(y∗|x∗,w)]
≈ 1
M
M∑
m=0
f(x∗,w); w ∼ p(w|D).
The resulting predictive distribution is categorical. We quantify its uncertainty using entropy:
H(y∗|x∗,D) =
K∑
k=1
p(y∗=ck|x∗,D) log p(y∗=ck|x∗,D).
This quantity contains aleatoric and epistemic components (Ha, He). The former is estimated as:
Ha = Ep(w|D)[H(y∗|x∗,w)] ≈ 1
M
M∑
m
H(y∗|x∗,w); w ∼ p(w|D).
The epistemic component can be obtained as the difference between the total and aleatoric entropies.
This quantity is also known as the mutual information between y∗ and w:
He = I(y
∗,w|x∗,D) = H(y∗|x∗,D)− Ep(w|D)[H(y∗|x∗,w)].
For regression, we employ heteroscedastic likelihood functions. Their mean and variance are
parametrized by our NN: p(y∗|x∗,w) = N (y; fµ(x∗,w), fσ2(x∗,w)). Marginalizing over w with
MC induces a Gaussian mixture distribution over outputs. Its mean is obtained as:
µa ≈ 1
M
M∑
m=0
fµ(x
∗,w); w ∼ p(w|D).
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There is no closed-form expression for the entropy of this distribution. Instead, we use the variance
of the GMM as an uncertainty metric. It also decomposes into aleatoric and epistemic components
(σ2a, σ
2
e):
σ2(y∗|x∗,D) = Ep(w|D)[σ2(y∗|x∗,w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2a
+σ2p(w|D)[µ(y
∗|x,w)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2e
.
These are also estimated with MC:
σ2(y∗|x∗,D) ≈ 1
M
M∑
m
µ(y∗|x∗,w)2 − ( 1
M
M∑
m
µ(y∗|x∗,w))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2e
+
1
M
M∑
m
σ2(y∗|x∗,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ2a
; w ∼ p(w|D).
Here, σ2e reflects model uncertainty - our lack of knowledge about w - while σ
2
a tells us about the
irreducible uncertainty or noise in our training data.
In Figure 11, we show the fit obtained with a BNN with scale adapted SG-HMC on the toy moons
dataset. We would like to highlight 2 key differences with respect to the logistic regression example
shown in Figure 2. Neural networks are very flexible models. They are capable of perfectly fitting non-
linear manifolds, such as moons. In consequence, when these models present aleatoric uncertainty it
is most often due to the inputs not containing enough information to predict the targets. As little such
noise exists in our particular instantiation of moons, our estimates of aleatoric entropy are close to 0.
Despite their flexibility, selecting a NN involves adopting some inductive biases [41]. Additionally,
unlike logistic regression, the weight space posterior of a BNN is very difficult to characterize. Both
of these things are reflected in the BNN predictive posterior’s epistemic uncertainty only growing in
the vertical axis, instead of in all directions.
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Figure 11: Left: Training points and BNN predictive distribution obtained on the moons dataset with
SG-HMC. Center: Aleatoric entropy Ha expressed by the model matches regions of class overlap.
Right: Epistemic entropy He grows as we move away from the data.
B.3 Architectures and other Network Hyperparameters
For all datasets, our BNNs are fully connected networks with residual connections. Auxiliary
VAEs and VAEACs used for tabular data use fully connected encoders and decoders with residual
connections and batch normalization at every layer. For MNIST, we employ 6 convolutional bottleneck
residual blocks [42] for both encoders and decoders. We use the same architecture for the VAEACs
used as ground truth generative models in the computationally grounded evaluation framework put
forth in Section 4. Note that the ground truth VAEAC models have slightly larger input spaces due to
them modeling inputs and targets jointly. All architectural hyperparameters are provided in Table 3.
In order to improve the artificial sample quality of our “ground truth” VAEACs, we leverage a
two-stage VAE configuration [43]. For all datasets, the lower level VAEs use the standard tabular data
VAE architecture described above, with 2 hidden layers. We use 300 hidden units for MNIST and
150 for other datasets. Additional details on our use of two-stage VAEs are provided in Appendix I.
We train all generative models with the RAdam optimizer [44] with a learning rate of 1e−4 for tabular
data and 3e−4 for MNIST. We found RAdam to yield marginally better results than Adam.
We convert categorical inputs to our BNNs into one-hot vectors. When building DGMs, we model
continuous inputs with diagonal, unit variance (heteroscedastic) Gaussian distributions. This choice
makes these models weigh all input dimensions equally, a desirable trait for explanation generation.
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Table 3: Network architecture hyperparameters used in all experiments. Depth refers to number of
hidden layers or residual blocks. Latent dimension values marked with a star (*) refer to the second
level VAEs for “ground truth” VAEACs.
Dataset BNN Depth BNN Width VAE / VAEAC Depth VAE Width VAEAC Width VAE / VAEAC Latent Dim
LSAT 2 200 3 300 350 4 (*4)
COMPAS 2 200 3 300 350 4 (*4)
Wine 2 200 3 300 350 6 (*6)
Credit 2 200 3 300 350 8 (*8)
MNIST 2 1200 6 - - 20 (*8)
We place categorical distributions over discrete inputs, expressing them as one-hot vectors. For the
LSAT, COMPAS, and Credit datasets, where there are both continuous and discrete features, data
likelihood values are obtained as the product of Gaussian likelihoods and categorical likelihoods.
During the CLUE optimization procedure, we approximate gradients through one-hot vectors with
the softmax function’s gradients. This is known as the softmax straight-through estimator [45]. It is
biased but works well in practice. For MNIST, we model pixels as the probabilities of a product of
Bernoulli distributions. We feed these probabilities directly into our BNNs and DGMs.
We normalize all continuously distributed features such that they have 0 mean and unit variance.
This facilitates model training and also ensures that all features are weighed equally under CLUE’s
pairwise distance metric in (4). For MNIST, this normalization is applied to whole images instead of
individual pixels. Categorical variables are not normalized. Changing a categorical variable implies
changing two bits in the corresponding one-hot vector. This creates the same `1 regularization penalty
as shifting a continuously distributed variable two standard deviations.
B.4 CLUE Hyperparameters
As mentioned in Section 5, in our experiments we only apply CLUE to points that present uncertainty
above a rejection threshold. The rejection thresholds used for each dataset are displayed in Table 4.
The same table contains the values of λx used in all experiments. In practice we define λ
′
x = λx · d,
where d is the input space dimensionality of a dataset. This makes the strength of CLUE’s pairwise
input space distance metric agnostic to dimensionality. We choose a significantly larger value of λ
′
x
for MNIST due to there being a large number of pixels that are always black.
Table 4: Values of CLUE’s input space similarity weight λx and uncertainty rejection thresholds used
for all experiments. Next to each dataset’s name is the the type of uncertainty quantified: standard
deviation (σ) or entropy (H). We report λx upscaled by each dataset’s input dimensionality d.
Dataset LSAT (σ) COMPAS (H) Wine (σ) Credit (H) MNIST (H)
λx · d 1.5 2 2.5 3 25
H threshold 1 0.2 2 0.5 0.5
C Multiplicity of CLUEs
We exploit the non-convexity of CLUE’s objective to generate diverse CLUEs. We initialize CLUE
with z0 =µφ(z|x0) + , where =N (z;0, σ0I), and perform Algorithm 1 multiple times to obtain
different CLUEs. We choose σ0 = 0.15. In Figure 12, we showcase different CLUEs for the same
original MNIST inputs. Different counterfactuals represent digits of different classes. Despite this,
all explanations resemble the original datapoints being explained. Being exposed to this multiplicity
could potentially inform practitioners about similarities of an original input to multiple classes that
lead their model to be uncertain.
Different initializations lead to CLUEs that explain away different amounts of uncertainty. In a few
rare cases CLUE fails: the algorithm does not produce a feature configuration which has significantly
lower uncertainty than the original input. This is the case for the third CLUE in the bottom 2 rows of
Figure 12. We attribute this to a disadvantageous initialization of z.
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In Figure 13, we show multiple CLUEs for a single individual from the COMPAS dataset. In this
case, uncertainty can be reduced by changing the individual’s prior convictions and charge degree,
or by changing their sex and age range. Making both sets of changes simultaneously also reduces
uncertainty.
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H=1.47, c=3 H=1.30, c=0 H=0.11, c=3 H=0.04, c=0 H=0.01, c=0 H=0.12, c=3
H=1.44, c=2 H=0.16, c=0 H=0.13, c=2 H=0.10, c=0 H=0.15, c=2 H=0.09, c=2
H=1.43, c=6 H=0.42, c=6 H=0.06, c=0 H=0.30, c=6 H=0.05, c=0 H=0.38, c=6
H=1.15, c=8 H=0.76, c=8 H=0.17, c=3 H=0.73, c=8 H=0.97, c=8 H=0.11, c=3
H=1.38, c=6 H=0.12, c=6 H=1.08, c=6 H=0.60, c=6 H=1.45, c=8 H=0.21, c=6
Figure 12: We generate 5 possible CLUEs for 11 MNIST digits score above the uncertainty rejection
threshold. Below each digit or counterfactual is the predictive entropy it is assigned H and the class
of maximum probability c.
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Figure 13: The leftmost entry is an uncertain COMPAS test sample. To its right are four candidate
CLUEs. The first three successfully reduce uncertainty past our rejection threshold, while the
rightmost does not.
D Sensitivity Analysis in High Dimensional Spaces
In high-dimensional input spaces, ∇xH will often not point in the direction of the data manifold.
This can result in meaningless explanations. In Figure 14, we show an example where a step in the
direction of −∇xH leads to a seemingly noisy input configuration for which the predictive entropy is
low. An “adversarial examples for uncertainty” is generated. Aggregating these steps for every point
in the test set leads to an uncertainty sensitivity analysis explanation that resembles white noise.
H=1.77 H=0.12 Ii
0.0075
0.0150
0.0225
0.0300
Figure 14: Left: A digit from the MNIST test set with large predictive entropy. Center: The same
digit after a step is taken in the direction of −∇xH. Non-zero weight is assigned to pixels that are
always zero valued. Right: Uncertainty sensitivity analysis for the entire MNIST test set.
E Visualizing Optimization in Latent Space
Figure 15 shows a 2 dimensional latent space trajectory from z0 to zCLUE for a test point from
the COMPAS dataset. In practice, we use larger latent spaces to ensure CLUEs are relevant to the
original inputs being explained.
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Figure 15: Left: CLUE latent trajectory for a test point from the Credit dataset in a two-dimensional
latent space. The blue dot marks the start of the trajectory and the orange one marks the end. Uncer-
tainty levels are displayed in greyscale. Right: Changes in aleatoric entropy for inputs regenerated
from latent codes along the trajectory.
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F Comparing CLUE to Feature Importance Estimators
Among machine learning practitioners, two of the most popular approaches for determining feature
importance from back-box models are LIME and SHAP [3]. LIME locally approximates the back-box
model of interest around a specific test point with a surrogate linear model [4]. This surrogate is
trained on points sampled from nearby the input of interest. The surrogate model’s weights for each
class can be interpreted as each feature’s contribution towards the prediction of said class. Kernel
SHAP extends lime by introducing a kernel such that resulting explanations have desirable properties
[33]. For SHAP, a reference input is chosen. It allows importance to be only assigned where the
inputs are different from the reference. For MNIST, the reference is an entirely black image. Note
that alternative versions of SHAP exist that incorporate information about internal NN dynamics
into their explanations. However, they produce very noisy explanations when applied to our BNNs.
We conjecture that this high variance might be induced by disagreement among the multiple weight
configurations from our BNNs.
yˆ = 0
Original
class: 0
LIME A
class: 7
LIME B
class: 2
LIME C
class: 0
SHAP A
class: 7
SHAP B
class: 2
SHAP C
yˆ = 1 class: 1 class: 3 class: 8 class: 1 class: 3 class: 8
yˆ = 2 class: 2 class: 3 class: 1 class: 2 class: 3 class: 1
yˆ = 3 class: 3 class: 5 class: 8 class: 3 class: 5 class: 8
yˆ = 4 class: 4 class: 9 class: 6 class: 4 class: 9 class: 6
yˆ = 5 class: 5 class: 0 class: 3 class: 5 class: 0 class: 3
yˆ = 6 class: 6 class: 5 class: 8 class: 6 class: 5 class: 8
yˆ = 7 class: 7 class: 9 class: 3 class: 7 class: 9 class: 3
yˆ = 8 class: 8 class: 3 class: 9 class: 8 class: 3 class: 9
yˆ = 9 class: 9 class: 3 class: 7 class: 9 class: 3 class: 7
Figure 16: High confidence MNIST test examples together with LIME and SHAP explanations for
the top 3 predicted classes. The model being investigated is a BNN with architecture described in
Appendix B. The highest probability class is denoted by yˆ.
Figure 16 shows examples of LIME and Kernel SHAP being applied to a BNN for high confidence
MNIST test digits. We use the default LIME hyperparameters for MNIST: the “quickshift” segmenta-
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tion algorithm with kernel size 1, maximum distance 5 and a ratio of 0.2. We plot the top 10 segments
with weight greater than 0.01. We draw 1000 samples with both methods.
Using the same configuration, we generate LIME and SHAP explanations for some MNIST digits to
which our BNN assigns predictive entropy above our rejection threshold. The results are displayed in
Figure 17.
yˆ = 8
Original
yˆ = 8
CLUE ∆CLUE
class: 8
LIME A
class: 4
LIME B
class: 5
LIME C
class: 8
SHAP A
class: 4
SHAP B
class: 5
SHAP C
yˆ = 9 yˆ = 9 class: 9 class: 7 class: 3 class: 9 class: 7 class: 3
yˆ = 7 yˆ = 7 class: 7 class: 0 class: 9 class: 7 class: 0 class: 9
yˆ = 3 yˆ = 6 class: 3 class: 5 class: 6 class: 3 class: 5 class: 6
yˆ = 1 yˆ = 1 class: 1 class: 8 class: 3 class: 1 class: 8 class: 3
yˆ = 6 yˆ = 0 class: 6 class: 0 class: 9 class: 6 class: 0 class: 9
yˆ = 7 yˆ = 7 class: 7 class: 2 class: 9 class: 7 class: 2 class: 9
yˆ = 3 yˆ = 3 class: 3 class: 0 class: 8 class: 3 class: 0 class: 8
yˆ = 8 yˆ = 8 class: 8 class: 3 class: 5 class: 8 class: 3 class: 5
yˆ = 9 yˆ = 8 class: 9 class: 8 class: 3 class: 9 class: 8 class: 3
Figure 17: Ten MNIST test digits for which our BNN’s predictive entropy is above the rejection
threshold. A single CLUE example is provided for each one. For each digit, the top scoring class is
denoted by yˆ. LIME and SHAP explanations are provided for the three most likely classes.
A positive CLUE attribution means that the addition of that feature will make our model more certain.
A positive feature importance attribution means the presence of that feature serves as evidence
towards a predicted class. A negative CLUE attribution means that the the absence of that feature
will make the model more certain. A negative feature importance attribution means the absence of
that feature would serve as evidence for a particular prediction. While CLUE and feature importance
techniques solve similar problems and both provide saliency maps, CLUE highlights regions that
need to be added or removed to make the input certain to a predictive model. In some cases, we see
that feature importance negative attribution aligns with CLUE negative attribution, suggesting the
features which negatively contribute to the model’s predicted probability are the features that need to
be removed to increase the models’ certainty. CLUE’s ability to suggest the addition of unobserved
features (positive CLUE attribution) is unique.
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The feature importance methods under consideration are difficult to retrofit for uncertainty. They are
unable to add features; they are limited to explaining the contribution of existing features. This may
suffice if our input contains all the information needed to make a prediction for a certain class but
otherwise results in noisy, potentially meaningless, explanations.
Generative-model based methods methods are counterfactual because they do not assign importance
to the observed features but rather propose alternative features based on the data manifold [6]. This is
the case for FIDO and CLUE. Generative modeling allows for increased flexibility, which is required
when dealing with uncertain inputs. Quantitatively contrasting feature importance and uncertainty
explanations under existing evaluation criteria [27] is an interesting direction for future work.
Methods like LIME and SHAP require a choice of class to produce explanations. This complicates
their use in scenarios where our model is uncertain and multiple classes have similarly high predictive
probability. On the other hand CLUEs are class agnostic.
G Additional CLUE and U-FIDO Examples
We provide additional examples of CLUEs generated for high uncertainty MNIST digits in Figure 18.
U-FIDO counterfactuals generated for the same inputs are shown in Figure 19. Both methods often
attribute importance to the same features. However, in almost all cases, CLUE is able to reduce
the original input’s uncertainty significantly more than U-FIDO. The latter method suggests smaller
changes. We attribute this to U-FIDO’s input masking mechanism being less flexible than CLUE’s
latent space generation mechanism.
H=1.37
Original
H=0.36
CLUE ∆CLUE
H=1.66
Original
H=0.20
CLUE ∆CLUE
H=1.34
Original
H=0.17
CLUE ∆CLUE
H=1.48 H=0.43 H=1.59 H=0.37 H=1.32 H=0.28
H=1.40 H=0.47 H=1.51 H=1.04 H=1.16 H=0.07
H=1.40 H=0.10 H=1.37 H=0.24 H=1.16 H=0.12
H=1.37 H=0.12 H=1.34 H=0.46 H=1.14 H=0.36
Figure 18: CLUEs generated for MNIST digits for which our BNN’s predictive entropy is above the
rejection threshold. The BNNs predictive entropy for both original inputs and CLUEs is shown under
the corresponding images.
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H=1.37
Original
H=0.68
U-FIDO ∆U-FIDO
H=1.66
Original
H=1.01
U-FIDO ∆U-FIDO
H=1.34
Original
H=0.53
U-FIDO ∆U-FIDO
H=1.48 H=0.74 H=1.59 H=1.46 H=1.32 H=0.35
H=1.40 H=0.99 H=1.51 H=1.26 H=1.16 H=0.07
H=1.40 H=0.42 H=1.37 H=1.14 H=1.16 H=0.51
H=1.37 H=0.65 H=1.34 H=0.95 H=1.14 H=0.42
Figure 19: U-FIDO counterfactuals generated for MNIST digits for which our BNN’s predictive
entropy is above the rejection threshold. The BNNs predictive entropy for both original inputs and
counterfactuals is shown under the corresponding images.
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H Additional Experimental Results
H.1 Ablation Experiments
In this subsection, we modify some of CLUE’s components individually and observe the effects on
the procedure’s results.
Initialization Strategy: Figure 20 compares Algorithm 1’s encoder-based initialization z0 =
µφ(z|x0) with z0 =0 on all datasets under consideration. For the LSAT, COMPAS and Wine datasets,
both approaches produce indistinguishable results. On Credit, our second highest dimensional dataset,
using an encoder-based initialization allows for CLUEs to stay slightly closer to original inputs in
terms of `1 distance.
The difference between both approaches is largest on MNIST. We conjecture that this might be due
to the higher dimensional nature of the latent space used with this dataset making optimization more
difficult. By initializing z as the VAE encoder’s mean, our optimizer starts near a local minima of
d(x,x0) and potentially of L(z). When Algorithm 1 is applied, the magnitude of ∇zH might not
be large enough to escape this basin of attraction. Thus, CLUE tends to leave most input features
unchanged, only addressing those with most potential to reduce uncertainty. This is also desirable
behavior for low uncertainty inputs; the closest low uncertainty sample is the input itself.
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Figure 20: Initialization strategy experiment results for all datasets under consideration. Colorbars’
horizontal blue line denotes each dataset’s rejection threshold.
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Capacity of CLUE’s DGM: To capture our predictive model’s reasoning, CLUE’s DGM must be
flexible enough to preserve atypical features in the inputs. As shown in Figure 21, reconstructions
from low-capacity VAEs do not preserve the predictive uncertainty of original inputs. The CLUEs
generated from these DGMs either leave the inputs unchanged or present large values of ∆x while
barely reducing H: these degenerate CLUEs simply emphasize regions of large reconstruction error.
As our DGM’s capacity increases, so does the amount of uncertainty preserved in the auto-encoding
operation. The amount of predictive uncertainty explained by CLUEs, which is given by the difference
between the autoencoded input uncertainty (orange bars) and CLUE uncertainty (blue bars), increases.
We see a clear relationship between dataset dimensionality and size of latent space needed for CLUE
to be effective.
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Figure 21: Amount of uncertainty explained away and `1 distance between original inputs and CLUEs
for every dataset under consideration and different capacity VAEs.
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Output Space Regularization Parameter λy: In Figure 22, we show how increasing λy reduces
the proportion of samples for which the predicted class differs between original inputs and CLUEs.
Interestingly, on LSAT, Wine and COMPAS, a small, but non-zero, value of λy results in more
uncertainty being explained away by CLUE. However, strongly enforcing similarity of predictions
generally comes at the cost of smaller amounts of uncertainty being explained away.
COMPAS predictions stay the same for all values of λy. Class predictions only depend on 2 of this
dataset’s input features (Age and Previous Convictions) [34]. We find that the remaining features
can increase or reduce confidence in the prediction given by the two key features, but never change
it. CLUEs only change non key features, reinforcing the current classification. On MNIST, we find
that, for certain values of λy , classifying CLUEs results in a lower error rate than classifying original
inputs. This is shown in Figure 23. We did not observe this effect for other datasets.
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Figure 22: CLUE ∆H vs prediction change for all datasets under consideration. Prediction change
refers to the proportion of CLUEs classified differently than their corresponding original inputs. All
values shown are averages across all testset points above the uncertainty rejection threshold.
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Figure 23: Left: Prediction change refers to the proportion of CLUEs classified differently than
their corresponding original inputs. Setting a value of λy of around 0.7 results in class predictions
for CLUEs being closer to the true labels than the original class predictions. Right: Reduction in
predictive entropy achieved by CLUE. All values shown are averages across all testset points above
the uncertainty rejection threshold.
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Applying CLUE to non-Bayesian NNs: These models are unable to capture model uncertainty. We
train deterministic NNs on every dataset under consideration using the architectures described in
Appendix B.4. We generate counterfactuals for their noise uncertainty. As shown in Figure 24, CLUE
is effective at explaining away noise uncertainty for regular NNs. More uncertain inputs are subject
to larger changes in terms of `1 distance.
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Figure 24: Amount of noise uncertainty explained away vs `1 shift in input space for all datasets under
consideration when applying CLUE to regular NNs. The colorbar indicates the original samples’
predictive uncertainty.
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Table 5: Relative performance measure obtained by all methods on all datasets under consideration.
Lower is better. e and a indicate results for epistemic (∆err gt) and aleatoric (∆Hgt) uncertainty
respectively.
LSAT COMPAS Wine Credit MNIST
Method e a e a e a e a e a
Sensitivity 0.697 0.672 0.707 0.122 0.691 0.001 0.623 0.454 0.682 0.698
CLUE 0.419 0.070 0.707 0.044 0 0.128 0 0.009 0.273 0.146
U-FIDO 0 0 0.707 0.303 0.224 0 0.233 0.628 0.450 0.516
H.2 Evaluation with Computationally Grounded Framework
Using the same experimental procedure described in Section 5, we compare local sensitivity analysis,
U-FIDO and CLUE in terms of amount of uncertainty explained away ∆Hgt vs proximity to the
data manifold max(0, log pgt(x¯c)− log pgt(x¯0)). Here, pgt(x¯0) refers to the log-likelihood of the
artificial data being explained. Again, we normalize both the uncertainty axis and the log-likelihood
axis using the largest values obtained by U-FIDO or CLUE. The knee point distances obtained are
displayed in Table 5. CLUE performs best in 8 out of 10 tasks. Generating counterfactuals directly
from the latent space of a VAE ensures that CLUEs are relevant.
H.3 Additional Analysis of User Study
While the main text showed the mean accuracy of CLUE over all tabular questions, we also consider
the breakdown of accuracy by dataset and by test point certainty in Table 6. CLUE outperforms all
baselines on both datasets. We find that sensitivity does significantly worse in higher dimensions (on
COMPAS), lending further credence to the intuition described in Appendix D.
When splitting by the certainty of test points, we immediately notice that accuracy for uncertain
test points is quite high for all methods. This similarity is expected since certain context points are
the only factor that varies between each method’s survey. Survey participants seemed to not use
the certain context points to identify uncertain test points. This is probably due to pilot procedure,
wherein Participant A carefully paired test points with relevant uncertain context points. Indeed, the
random baseline, which controls for the possibility that our task can be solved without access to a
relevant counterfactual, performs best on uncertain test points. However, we note a large difference
between methods’ results when identifying certain test points. CLUE’s accuracy almost doubles the
second best method’s (Human CLUE). When generating Human CLUEs Participant B had knowledge
of the uncertain context point, but not the test point (just like other methods). For this reason, we
expect to see dissimilarity in methods’ performance on certain test points. CLUE’s ability to bring
about most relevant contrast is one possible explanation for why it does so much better than baselines
for certain context points.
Table 6: Accuracy (%) of participants on the Tabular main survey broken down by dataset and by
certainty of test points.
Combined LSAT COMPAS Certain Test Uncertain Test
CLUE 82.22 83.33 81.11 71.00 96.25
Human CLUE 62.22 61.11 63.33 38.00 92.50
Random 61.67 62.22 61.11 31.00 100
Local Sensitivity 52.78 56.67 48.89 20.90 92.50
In addition to the Neymeni Test discussed in the main text, we also run paired Wilcoxon tests of
CLUE against each baseline [36]. Under a standard 0.05 acceptance threshold, CLUE significantly
outperforms all baselines on the Wilcoxon test as well: CLUE vs. Random (p = 1.47e−5), CLUE
vs. Sensitivity (p = 2.60e−9), and CLUE vs. Human CLUE (p = 2.34e−5). Statistical significance
under the Wilcoxon test holds even if we apply the Bonferroni correction. We conclude that CLUE is
useful for practitioners to identify the certainty of test points.
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I Additional Details on the Generative Model used in the Proposed
Computationally Grounded Evaluation Framework
The framework described in Figure 6 uses a conditional DGM, specifically a VAEAC [28], to both
generate artificial data and to evaluate explanations for said data. VAEs are known for generating
blurry or overly smoothed data. For our evaluation framework to work well, we require the ground
truth DGM to generate sharp data, with atypical characteristic that would to lead to a predictor being
uncertain. We can ensure that this is the case by using a large latent dimensionality. However, this
brings forth another well-known issue with VAEs: distribution mismatch [43; 46; 47]. The region of
latent space where the encoder places probability mass, also known as the aggregate posterior,
qφ(z) =
∫
qφ(z|x)p(x) dx
does not match the prior p(z).
To visualize this phenomenon, we train a BNN and a VAE on MNIST. We sample points from the
VAE’s latent space and evaluate their uncertainty with the BNN. As shown in Figure 25, clusters of
same-class digits form in latent space. The aggregate posterior presents low density in the spaces
between clusters. Digits generated from these areas are of low-quality, causing our BNN to be
uncertain. The outer regions of latent space, where the isotropic Gaussian prior has low density, also
generate uncertain digits.
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Figure 25: Predictive entropy estimates for artificial MNIST digits generated from a 2-dimensional
VAE latent space. The MNIST test set digits have been projected onto the latent space and are
displayed with a different color per class.
Recently, Dai and Wipf [43] have proposed the two-level VAE as a solution to distribution mismatch.
After training a standard VAE, a second VAE is trained on samples from the first VAE’s latent
space. As illustrated in Figure 26, the aggregate posterior over the inner latent variables, which
we denote by q(u), more closely resembles the prior. The joint distribution over inputs and latent
variables factorizes as: p(x, z,u) = p(x|z)p(z|u)p(u). We refer the reader to [43] for a detailed
analysis. Figure 27 shows that, while generating digits from samples of p(z) results in a large amount
of low-quality or OOD reconstructions, samples from p(u) map to clean digits. The two-stage
mechanism restores the VAE’s pivotal ancestral sampling capability, ensuring that our experiments
with artificial data will be representative of methods performance on real data.
In order to generate artificial data, we draw samples from the auxiliary latent space, map them back to
the VAEAC’s latent space and then map them to the input space. This allows for high-quality sample
generation. In this way, a single VAEAC can be used for both ancestral sampling and conditional
sampling. In addition, it allows us to estimate the log-likelihood of inputs as:
log pgt(x) = log
∫
pθ1(x|z)pθ2(z|u)p(u) dz du (8)
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Figure 26: In its first stage, the two-level VAE maps input samples to approximate posteriors in the
outer latent space. The aggregate posterior over this latent space need not resemble the isotropic
Gaussian prior. The second VAE maps samples from the outer latent space to approximate posteriors
in the inner latent space. The aggregate posterior over the inner latent space more closely matches
the prior.
Figure 27: Left: Digits generated from the inner latent space of a VAEAC trained on MNIST with a
two-level mechanism. Right: Digits generated from the latent space of a VAEAC trained on MNIST.
u and z are drawn from N (0, I).
In (8) parameter subscripts refer to the outer (1st level) and inner (2nd level) networks. In order to
preserve computational tractability, we approximate pθ2(z|u) with a point estimate placed at its mean
pθ2(z|u) ≈ δ(z− µθ2(z|u)). We further approximate (8) with importance sampling:
log pgt(x) ≈ log 1
K
K∑
k=1
pθ1(x|z=µθ2(z|uk))p(uk)
q(uk|x) ; uk ∼ q(u|x) (9)
I.1 Comparison of Methods under a Ground Truth DGM
The two-level VAEAC setup described above partially addresses the concern that our synthetic data
might not be diverse enough to highlight differences among the methods being compared. Indeed,
our results from Table 1 and Table 5 show noticeable differences in performance across methods.
We now address the opposite concern; methods that leverage auxiliary VAEs might be unfairly
advantaged under our functionally grounded framework, as the generative process of our synthetic
data is also VAE-based. Because VAEs are very flexible neural network based generative models,
using them as a ground truth provides relatively little inductive biases for auxiliary DGMs to take
advantage of. Additionally, our ground truth VAEAC captures the joint distribution of inputs and
targets. The metric of interest, ∆Hgt, only depends on the conditional distribution over targets
pgt(y|x). Our auxiliary DGMs only model inputs.
Two of the methods we evaluate, U-FIDO and CLUE, leverage auxiliary DGMs. Thus, both would be
equally advantaged. The ∆Hgt vs pgt(x¯c) metric from Table 5 is the most dependent on the ground
truth VAEAC. However, we observe the largest difference between CLUE and U-FIDO on in this
metric.
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J Details on User Study
J.1 Additional Details on Tabular User Study
For our pilot point selection procedure, we take points from each dataset’s test set that score above
the uncertainty rejection thresholds described in Appendix B.4 as uncertain points. Points below the
thresholds are labeled as certain points. Pilot procedure participants, referred to as participant A in
the main text, were not informed that the pools were split up by the points’ certainty with respect to
the BNN being explained.
(a) Consent Form for the Tabular Main Survey (b) Attention Check for the Tabular Main Survey
Figure 28: Setup of tabular user studies.
We now go through the various sections of the main survey. In Figure 28a, we include the consent
form used in our user studies. This user study was performed with the approval of the University of
Cambridge’s Department of Engineering Research Ethics Committee. Only three participants who
were asked to take the survey did not provide consent and thus exited the form. We still ensured that
at least ten participants took each of the four survey variants.
We then include an example question for each dataset, called an “attention check.” An example is
shown in Figure 28b. Note that the answer to this example question is provided in line. Later in
the survey, we ask participants this exact same question. We ask one attention check per dataset. If
participants get the attention check wrong for both datasets, we void their results. We only had to void
one result. This did not affect our criteria of ten completed surveys per variant. The consent form and
attention check questions were the same for all survey variants. The main survey participants were
first asked the ten LSAT questions followed by the ten COMPAS questions: we made this design
decision since the dimensionality of LSAT is lower than that of COMPAS, easing participants into
the task. Examples of questions from the CLUE survey variant are shown in Figure 29.
J.2 MNIST User Study
In order to validate CLUE on image data, we create a modified MNIST dataset with clear failure
modes for practitioners to identify. We first discard all classes except four, seven, and nine. We then
manually identify forty sevens from the training set which have dashes crossing their stems. Using
K-nearest-neighbors, we identify the twelve sevens closest to each of the ones manually selected.
We delete these 520 sevens from our dataset. We repeat the same procedure for fours which have a
closed, triangle-shaped top. We do not delete any digits from the test set. We train a BNN on this
new dataset. Our BNN presents high epistemic uncertainty when tested on dashed sevens and closed
fours as a consequence of the sparsity of these features in the train set.
We evaluate the test set of fours, sevens, and nines with our BNN. Datapoints that surpass our
uncertainty threshold are selected as candidates to be shown in our user study as uncertain context
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(a) Two LSAT questions with certain points generated
by CLUE
(b) Two COMPAS questions with certain points generated
by CLUE
Figure 29: Example Tabular Main Survey questions
Figure 30: Examples of high uncertainty digits containing characteristics that are uncommon in our
modified MNIST dataset. Their corresponding CLUEs and ∆CLUEs are displayed beside them.
examples or test questions. We show example CLUEs for a four and a seven that display the
characteristics of interest in Figure 30.
Leveraging the modified MNIST dataset, we run another user study with 10 questions and two
variants. Unlike our tabular experiments, we show practitioners a set of five context points to start,
as opposed to a pair. This set of context points is chosen at random from the training set. The first
variant involves showing users the set of context points, labeled with if their uncertainty surpasses our
predefined threshold. We then ask users to predict if new test points will be certain or uncertain to
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the BNN. The second variant contains the same labeled context points and test datapoints. However,
together with uncertain context points, practitioners are shown CLUEs of how the input features can
be changed such that the BNN’s uncertainty falls below the rejection threshold. The practitioners are
then asked to decide if new points’ predictions will be certain or not. If CLUE works as intended,
practitioners taking the second variant should be able to identify points on which the BNN will be
uncertain more accurately.
The first variant was shown to 5 graduate students with machine learning expertise who only received
context points and rejection labels (uncertain or not). This group was able to correctly classify 67%
of the new test points as high or low uncertainty. The second variant was shown to 5 other graduate
students with machine learning expertise who received context points together with CLUEs in cases
of high uncertainty. This group was able to reach an accuracy of 88% on new test points. This user
study suggests CLUEs are useful for practitioners in image-based settings as well.
(a) Example Context Set with CLUEs
(b) Example question
Figure 31: MNIST User Study Setup
33
